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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Priority Of Claims Between Holders Of
Unrecorded Chattel Mortgages
Plaza Corp. v. Alban'
After deciding that the Alban Tractor Co., Inc. (Alban),
had "waived" its rights under a recorded conditional sales
contract by subsequently taking a chattel mortgage on the
same property, the Court of Appeals had to determine the
priority between that mortgage and a mortgage on the
property to the Plaza Corporation (Plaza), executed after
the conditional sale to Alban but before the chattel mort-
gage to it. Plaza had promptly mailed its mortgage
for recording to the Circuit Court of Baltimore County,
where the mortgagor's principal place of business was
situated. The mortgage was set out in its entirety in the
Baltimore County Land Records, but the clerk failed to
list a notation of this mortgage in the Chattel Record
index, as is required for all mortgages which cover both
real and personal property.' On the other hand, Alban's
chattel mortgage was recorded in Baltimore City, where
Alban believed the mortgagor's principal place of business
to be situated.' The Court of Appeals, in reversing and
entering judgment for Plaza, held that, both mortgages
being in legal effect unrecorded, the prior mortgage to
Plaza had priority under the chattel mortgage recordation
statutes.
The impact of the instant case cannot fully be appre-
ciated without first exploring the wilderness that had
heretofore existed in this area prior to the 1949 amend-
ment to one of Maryland's chattel mortgage recordation
statutes.
Generally, at common law, the only chattel mortgages
that were valid against subsequent purchasers or creditors
1219 Md. 570, 151 A. 2d 170 (1959). [Editor's Note: This note was with-
held from publication until now, pending further litigation involving the
parties. See Wethered v. Alban Tractor Co ... Md ... , 168 A. 2d 358
(191) ].
22 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 17, §§ 50, 54; see also BALTIMORE COUNTY CODE
(Everstine, 1955) §§ 26, 27.
12 MT. CODE (1957) Art. 21, §§ 45, 46, require a chattel mortgage to be
recorded where the mortgagor "resides." A corporation "resides," for this
purpose, in that place where its articles of incorporation state its principal
office to be. O'Toole Tire Co. v. Gaither, Inc., 216 Md. 54, 139 A. 2d
252 (1958).
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without notice were those accompanied by delivery of
possession.' Maryland, in addition, upheld the validity of
certain secret conveyances against such persons even though
the debtor retained possession.5 The Legislature, in 1729,
wishing to prevent all secret liens,' enacted a statute which
provided that:
" ... no goods or chattels, whereof the ... mortgagor
. . . shall remain in possession, shall pass, alter or
change, or any property therein be transferred to
any .. .mortgagee ... unless the same be in writing,
and acknowledged...."
"PROVIDED ALWAYs, That nothing in this act shall ex-
tend, or be construed to extend, to make void any
such... mortgage.., against such mortgagor... or
any claiming under him. . .."I
Even in the absence of delivery or recording, however, the
holder of an unrecorded mortgage still prevailed as against
the mortgagor, parties claiming under the mortgagor,
parties with notice of the mortgage, and antecedent credi-
tors who failed to perfect their liens prior to the execution
of the unrecorded mortgage.' Delivery of possession to
the mortgagee charged third parties with actual notice of
the lien, whereas recording as prescribed by the statute
gave them constructive notice.
In 1856, the Legislature enacted a statute which re-
quired the acknowledgment and recording of a chattel
mortgage whether or not delivery of possession was made
to the mortgagee:
"Mortgages of personal property shall1 be valid and
take effect, except as between parties thereto, only
from the time of recording; and in case of more than
one mortgage, the one first recorded shall have prefer-
ence."9
4 Supra, n. 1, 585; 1 JONES. CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES
(6th ed. 1933) § 176.
5 Supra, n. 1, 586; Hambleton v. Hayward, 4 H. & J. 443 ('Md. 1819)
(retention of possession said to be not per se fraudulent before Act of
1729, although it presented grounds for suspicion).
6 MD. LAWS 1729, Ch. 8, § 5.
MD. LAWS 1729, Ch. 8, §§ 5, 6.
1 Clagett et al. v. Salmon, 5 G. & J. 314, 346 (Md. 1833) (unrecorded
chattel mortgage legally operative against the mortgagor and all claiming
under him).
MD. LAWS 1856, Ch. 154, § 143.
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This statute apparently was intended, to render all un-
recorded mortgages absolutely void except as between the
parties thereto. However, the Maryland Court of Appeals
refused to read the statute literally and consistently stated
the rule that:
"Defectively executed or unrecorded chattel mort-
gages have been held to be preferred in the state
[Maryland] as to prior existing creditors, equal to
general subsequent creditors, but subject to later lien
creditors whose liens were duly executed and recorded
or secured."' 0
Under the above-stated rule, which remained the Mary-
land law until 1949, the Court seemingly allowed the
holder of an unrecorded chattel mortgage to prevail over
a prior existing creditor for two reasons (1) The prior
creditor who extended credit before the execution of the
chattel mortgage could not have been deceived by the
mortgagee's failure to record. (2) The prior general credi-
tor did not secure his claim in any way."
10 Motor Car Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 154 Md. 77, 83, 140 A. 34 (1928)
(dictum). The Court of Appeals in Plaza Corp. v. Alban, 219 Md. 570, 588,
151 A. 2d 170 (1959), quoted this sentence. See also Tyler Co. v. O'Ferrall,
153 Md. 353, 356, 138 A. 249 (1927) (holder of an invalidly executed
chattel mortgage preferred over all prior existing unsecured creditors);
Davis v. Harlow, 130 Md. 165, 100 A. 102 (1917) (trustee in bankruptcy
has the status of a lien creditor) ; Praeger v. Implement Co., 122 Md. 303,
308, 89 A. 501 (1914); Textor v. Orr, 86 Md. 392, 398, 38 A. 939 (1897)
(equitable lien enforceable against the mortgagor and the assignee of the
mortgagor for the benefit of creditors); Stanhope v. iodge, 52 Md. 483
(1879).
The Legislature in 1916 enacted a statute, Mi. LAws 1916, Ch. 355, § 53B,
requiring conditional sales contracts to be recorded in order to be valid
against third parties without notice. The Court of Appeals construed the
protection to third parties to be the same under this statute as it did under
the ones pertaining to chattel mortgages, despite dissimilarities in the
wordings. Roberts & Co. v. Robinson, 141 Md. 37, 43, 118 A. 198 (1922),
in discussing the rights of a subsequent general creditor as against the
holder of a prior unrecorded conditional sales contract, said:
"As between the immediate parties, the contract is valid, but 'as to
third persons without notice' it is declared to be void until placed upon
the public records in the manner prescribed .... If It [conditional sales
recordation statute] had been intended to protect only purchasers and
lienors, that purpose would have been expressed. The general terms
employed indicate that the statute was designed to safeguard the in-
terest of all persons, acting without notice of the unrecorded contract,
who would be injuriously affected if it were permitted to be enforced."
See Arnold, Conditional Sales of Chattels in Maryland, 1 Md. L. Rev. 187,
198 et seq. (1937).
n Compare language of Gunby v. Motor Truck Corp., 156 Md. 19, 25, 142
A. 596 (1928), with cases cited supra, n. 10.
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In Gunby v. Motor Truck Corp.,12 a party who extended
credit prior to the execution of an unrecorded conditional
sale and then subsequent thereto obtained a lien was not
afforded protection as against the holder of an unrecorded
conditional sale. Despite the diligence exercised by the
antecedent creditor, the Court held against him, reasoning
that he, a prior party, could not have been deceived by
the conditional vendor's failure to record. A close reading
of the Gunby case seems to indicate that the holder of an
unrecorded chattel mortgage would have been similarly
protected under the same circumstances.
In 1949, the Legislature amended the Act of 1729
(which had been re-enacted without substantial change
in 1856), with the obvious purpose of limiting protection
to the specified groups of third persons named therein:
"No personal property ... whereof the ... mort-
gagor... shall remain in possession, shall pass, alter,
or change, or any property therein shall be trans-
ferred to any... mortgagee.., as against subsequent
purchasers, mortgagees, incumbrancers, landlords with
liens, pledgees, receivers, and creditors who acquired a
lien by judicial proceedings on such personal property,
unless by... mortgage acknowledged, and recorded as
herein provided; but nothing herein shall be construed
to extend to any sale or gift, where the same is accom-
paied by delivery, nor to invalidate such transfer as
between the parties thereto."'"
Although subsequent purchasers and lienors were still
among those protected, the statute eliminated the pro-
tection that had been previously afforded to subsequent
general creditors who failed to obtain liens before recorda-
tion of the mortgage.' 4
A question is raised under this statute as to whom the
Legislature intended to be included in the protected classi-
fication of "subsequent" parties.
Tatelbaum v. Nat'l Store Etc. Co." indicated in dictum
that Maryland seems to have abandoned its peculiar prin-
ciple of protecting subsequent purchasers, lienors, and
1 156 Md. 19, 25, 142 A. 596 (1928).
182 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 21, § 41. This conditional sales recordation
statute, discussed supra, n. 10, was similarly amended in 1949. 2 MD. CODE
(1957) Art. 21, § 66.
11 Tatelbaum v. Natl. Store Etc. Co., 196 Md. 599, 78 A. 2d 228 (1951)
(dictum).
1 Ibid.
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general creditors without notice, and to have adopted a
race of diligence - in which any creditor, antecedent or
subsequent, who obtains a lien would be preferred to the
holder of an unrecorded chattel mortgage.
In the Plaza case, 16 the specific issue was whether a sub-
sequent mortgagee had to have his mortgage recorded in
order to have a claim superior to that of the holder of a
prior unrecorded mortgage on the same property. The
Court answered this question in the affirmative despite
the language of the 1949 amended statute, since codified
as Article 21, Section 41, which provides that "[n] o per-
sonal property.., whereof the mortgagor... shall remain
in possession, shall pass .. .to any . . .mortgagee .. .
as against subsequent ... mortgagees .. .unless by ...
mortgage acknowledged and recorded as herein pro-
vided. . .. " When read alone, Section 41 seems to in-
dicate the opposite result should have been reached. The
Court of Appeals, however, in reading Section 41 together
with the Act of 1856, now codified as Article 21, Section
48,18 reasoned that a party does not gain the status of "sub-
sequent.. . mortgagee" within the meaning of the statute
until his mortgage has been acknowledged and recorded.19
Otherwise, Section, 48 would be in direct conflict with
Section 41, and it can be assumed that if the Legislature
intended such a result it would have repealed Section 48
in 1949. Thus, so long as two chattel mortgages remain
unrecorded, the one that was executed prior in time takes
precedence because the holder of the latter is nothing
more than a subsequent general creditor until he records.20
The Court's construction of Sections 41 and 48 seems to
be the proper one. By requiring a "subsequent" mortgagee
to record, the Court seems to be following the legislative
intent of withdrawing the protection previously given
to subsequent general creditors and limiting it to the group
specified in the 1949 amendment. Also, such a construction
is in accord with the common law rule, generally followed,
"Plaza Corp. v. Alban, 219 Md. 570, 151 A. 2d 170 (1959).
"2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 21, § 41.
"2 MD. CoDE (1957) Art. 21, § 48.
19 Supra, n. 15, 590.
'Ibid. For a case in apparent opposition but reconciliable due to
statutory difference, see Stem v. Crawford, 133 Md. 579, 105 A. 780 (1919).
There the Court had to determine the rights between two successive pur-
chasers of the same wheat crop. Neither purchaser had taken possession
nor recorded a bill of sale. The Court held in favor of the subsequent
purchaser, saying that his failure to have a bill of sale recorded could only
be important if there were a purchaser subsequent to him.
[VOL. XXI
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in this country, of determining the rights between the two
holders of unrecorded chattel mortgages according to the
priority in their execution.2"
DANIEL W. MOYLAN
2'4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY (1952) § 17.5, 545; 1 JONES, CHATTEL
MORTGAGES AND CONDmTIONAL SAL S (6th ed. 1933) § 176; 45 Am. Jur. 504,
Records & Recording Laws, § 143; 59 C.J.S. 337, Mortgages, § 274.
The above rule does not apply if there is a statute which makes an un-
recorded conveyance absolutely void after a certain specified time has
elapsed. Notwithstanding the statutory requirements in 2 MD. CODE (1957)
Art. 21, § 46, which provides that "[a] mortgage of personal property
shall be executed, -acknowledged and recorded as bills of sale," and § 45,
which provides that "[b]ills of sale shall be recorded . . . within twenty
days from the date thereof," the Court of Appeals in Balto. Credit Union v.
Thorne, 214 Md. 200, 134 A. 2d 84 (1957), held that a chattel mortgage was
valid -and gave constructive notice from the date recorded whether within
twenty days or not.
